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 Modern-day research studies conducted on the victimisation of children 
in South Africa show that South African children in particular 
experience and witness exceptionally high levels of crime and 
consequently represent a significant portion of the victims and 
witnesses that have to appear in court to testify about these crimes. In 
South Africa, as in many other countries, a child is, however, permitted 
to testify in a criminal court only once the presiding officer is satisfied 
that the child is competent to be a witness. The competency test, 
though, presents a critical initial challenge for child witnesses, as it 
focuses on their ability to answer questions about the concepts of truth 
and lies. These inquiries can be intimidating and confusing, especially 
to younger children, and may result in children who would otherwise 
have been capable of giving evidence being prevented from giving their 
testimony. Various legal and psychological fraternities have 
accordingly called for the abolition or amendment of the truth-lie 
competency requirement. Recent psychological research about the 
potential of a child to lie has once again raised fundamental questions 
about the competency inquiry, suggesting that an assessment of 
children's understanding of truth and lies has no bearing on whether 
the child will in fact provide truthful evidence in court. These empirical 
findings precipitated the amendment of competency rules by various 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada. The findings 
likewise raise serious questions and or doubt about the suitability of the 
South African competency requirements. The purpose of this paper is 
to review the current South African position with a view to proposing 
suggestions for meaningful legal reform. 
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1  Introduction 
Contemporary research studies conducted on the victimisation of children 
in South Africa show that South African children in particular experience and 
witness exceptionally high levels of crime. The incidence of child rape and 
sexual assault upon minors, for example, has reached epidemic 
proportions.1 Alarmingly, these studies also indicate a trend towards a 
decrease in the age of these victims, while the use of brute force directed 
against them is escalating.2 Population-based prevalence studies show that 
the most common forms of violence against children reported in South 
                                            
⃰  Mildred Bekink. LLB (Unisa), LLM (Pret), LLD (Unisa). Senior Lecturer at the 
Department of Mercantile Law, College of Law, University of South Africa. E-mail: 
bekinm@unisa.ac.za. Part of the article is based on a chapter in the LLD dissertation, 
The Protection of Child Victims and Witnesses in a Post-Constitutional Criminal 
Justice System with Specific Reference to the Role of an Intermediary: A Legal 
Study, by the author and awarded in 2017. 
1  Paula Barnard, the national director of World Vision South Africa, speaking during 
National Child Protection Week in May 2017, stated that "Violence against children 
has reached epidemic proportions and like any other disease, be it HIV/Aids or 
Ebola, it should be treated as a national disaster and remedied accordingly" (Seeth 
2017 http://city-press.news24.com/News/violence-against-children-a-national-
disaster-20170529). A national prevalence study published in 2016 provides some 
data relating to the prevalence of violence against children. This study estimates that 
34% of the country's children are the victims of sexual violence and physical abuse 
before they reach the age of 18 (Artz et al 2016 http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads 
/2/7/8/4/27845461/08_cjcp_report_2016_d.pdf). 
2 According to a shocking revelation in October 2017, it appears that a Soweto school 
guard allegedly sexually assaulted 87 schoolgirls, some as young as four years old, 
over a period of ten months. The school principal, who was informed about the 
incidents, initially failed to take the necessary action (see Fengu 2017 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/he-seemed-like-an-angel-20171014). 
Recent crime statistics indicate the extent of violence in South Africa. According to 
Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017, 58 013 individual victims 
16 years and older experienced sexual offences, and 307 732 experienced assault 
(Stats SA 2017 http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10521). Unfortunately, although 
certain categories such as homicide and sexual assault are routinely reported, the 
statistics were not disaggregated for children in 2016/2017, as had been done in 
2011/2012. A paper analysing the 2011/2012 crime statistics indicates that 180 537 
contact crimes (defined as crimes that involved physical contact between victims and 
perpetrators) against women 18 years and older were reported and that 50 688 
crimes against children younger than 18 years of age were reported. Of the latter 50 
688 cases, 793 involved the murder of children, 758 involved the attempted murder 
of children, 25 866 involved sexual offences against children, 12 645 involved the 
common assault of children, and 10 630 children were cases of assault of children 
with grievous bodily harm (SAPS 2012 http://www.saps.gov.za/ 
statistics/reports/crimestats/2012/downloads/crime_statistics_presentation.pdf). A 
review of juvenile fatalities conducted from January 2014 to December 2014 on 711 
deceased children who passed through the Salt River and Phoenix morgues during 
that period indicated that 32% of all unnatural deaths were cases of homicide. Most 
of these cases involved child abuse. More than three-quarters of the children who 
died from child abuse (78%) were under the age of 5 (Faber Sunday Times 12).  
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Africa are physical and sexual violence in the home and community.3 If the 
offenders are apprehended, these child victims and witnesses have to 
undergo the daunting experience of appearing in court to face the 
perpetrators. Statistics indicate that a growing number of the victims and 
witnesses who have to appear in court to testify about these crimes are 
therefore children.4  
In South Africa a child is permitted to testify in a criminal court only once the 
presiding officer is satisfied that the child is "competent" to be a witness.5 
However, the competency test presents a critical initial challenge for child 
witnesses, as it focuses on children's ability to answer questions about the 
concepts of truth and falsehood.6 The truth-lie competency test sets out to 
determine a child's understanding of truth and lies, and the importance of 
telling the truth in court. The notion underlying the truth-lie inquiry is that a 
child who understands the meaning of telling the truth is capable of 
providing reliable evidence in a criminal proceeding.7 These inquiries can 
be intimidating and confusing, especially to younger children, and may 
result in children who would otherwise have been capable of giving 
evidence being prevented from giving their testimony.8 
Various legal and psychological fraternities have accordingly called for the 
abolition or amendment of the truth-lie competency requirement, citing the 
legal and psychological dilemmas that children experience in being qualified 
as competent witnesses.9 These submissions have been unsuccessful to 
date. Recent psychological research about the potential of a child to lie once 
again raised fundamental questions about the competency inquiry, 
suggesting that an assessment of children's understanding of truth and lies 
                                            
3  DSD, DWCPD and UNICEF Violence against Children 3; Jamieson, Sambu and 
Matthews Out of Harm's Way? reported that 56% of the children in Mpumalanga and 
the Western Cape reported a lifetime prevalence of physical abuse by caregivers, 
teachers or relatives. 
4  Artz et al 2016 http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads/2/7/8/4/27845461/08_cjcp_ 
report_2016_d.pdf. A report by Fang et al indicated that the estimated economic 
value of disability-adjusted life years lost owing to violence against children in 2015 
amounted to R196 billion, or 4.9% of South Africa's GDP in 2015 (Fang et al 2016 
https://www.savethechildren.org.za/sci-za/files/47/47ab7077-1d0d-4c37-8ae2-
161b18ae427a.pdf).  
5  Section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Criminal 
Procedure Act).  
6  S v Mokoena, S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T).  
7  Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC) para 165 (hereinafter DPP v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development); S v QN 2012 1 SACR 380 (KZP); S v Matshiva 
2014 1 SACR 29 (SCA). 
8  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 165. 
9  S v Mokoena, S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T); SALC Project 107; Meintjies 
2015 http://www.sapsac.co.za/newsletters/SAPSAC_Newsletter_Vol_15.4.pdf; 
Kruger, Pretorius and Diale 2016 CARSA 1-12. 
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has no bearing on whether the child will in fact provide truthful evidence in 
court.10 The empirical findings that children's understanding of truths and 
lies does not necessarily correlate with truthful accounts of their experiences 
precipitated the amendment of competency rules by various countries such 
as the United Kingdom and Canada.11 These findings likewise raise serious 
questions and or/doubt concerning the suitability of the South African 
competency requirements. The purpose of this paper is to review the current 
South African position, and to undertake a legal comparison. It is anticipated 
that this review and legal comparison may assist in providing valuable 
insights and knowledge, which may in turn give rise to suggestions for 
meaningful legal reform.  
2 Competency of South African child victims and child 
witnesses to testify 
Competence has been described as "central to the workings of the 
adversarial trial."12 In terms of the accusatorial system a witness needs to 
be competent before evidence may be presented to the court. The general 
rule, in terms of the South African accusatorial system, is that everyone 
(including a child) is presumed to be a competent witness. In this regard 
section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act13 states the following: 
Every person not expressly excluded from this Act from giving evidence shall, 
subject to the provisions of s 206, be competent and compellable to give 
evidence in criminal proceedings.14 
The question of compellability and competence is decided by the court in 
which the criminal proceedings are to be conducted.15 This involves a trial-
within-a trial at which the witness may be questioned by the presiding officer. 
Witnesses may also be called to give testimony as to the competence of the 
witness. No universal test for the determination of competence exists.16 An 
investigation into the competence of a witness involves questions of fact 
                                            
10  Bala et al 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 53-77; Bala 2014 Roger Williams U L Rev 525-
528; Evans and Lyon 2012 Law & Hum Behav 195-205. 
11  Bala et al 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 53-77; Bala 2014 Roger Williams U L Rev 525-
528. 
12 Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 22-20A. 
13  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
14 In terms of s 206 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the law as to the competency, 
compellability or privilege of witnesses which was in force in respect of criminal 
proceedings on the thirteenth day of May 1961 shall apply in any case not expressly 
provided for by this Act or any other law. 
15 Section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
16  This is one of the concerns expressed about child witness competency testing. In 
view of this lacuna, research was conducted by Kruger, Pretorius and Diale to 
develop a framework for child witness competency testing in order to standardize 
child witness competency testing procedures (see Kruger, Pretorius and Diale 2016 
CARSA 1-12). 
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and usually includes an investigation into whether the witness understands 
and appreciates the nature of an oath.17 
Children are regarded as competent witnesses if in the opinion of the court 
they are able to understand the difference between the truth and a lie and 
have an appreciation of the seriousness of the occasion and the 
consequences of lying. In this regard it should be noted that an examination 
of the South African criminal justice system reveals that age itself is not a 
discernible factor in the determination of children's competency. Children as 
young as three or four years have given testimony.18 In R v J,19 a case of 
indecent assault, the court found the complainant, a four-year-old girl, to be 
"a bright little girl who gave her evidence readily without prompting or 
leading." According to Zeffert and Paizes the question of a child's 
competency should not be confused with that of whether the child should 
be required to take the oath or affirmation or be admonished to speak the 
truth. However, in practice, owing to the requirements of section 162 (that 
all witnesses must testify under oath) a test for competency has by 
implication resulted in an enquiry into these aspects.20 
When a child is called to testify, the presiding officer first has to determine 
whether the child understands the nature of the oath. In S v L21 the court 
held that it is the duty of the presiding officer to determine whether the child 
has sufficient intelligence to appreciate the consequences of the religious 
obligation and sanctity of the oath, the capacity to understand the difference 
between the truth and a lie, and the ability to understand the import of telling 
the truth. Only if a "child is capable of giving a truthful and intelligible account 
of the matter upon which he is called" should he or she be allowed to 
testify.22 
                                            
17 Zeffert and Paizes Essential Evidence 259. 
18 R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A); R v Bell 1929 CPD 478; R v J 1958 3 SA 699 (SR). 
19 R v J 1958 3 SA 699 (SR) 701A. 
20 A test for competency should include the child's ability to communicate, observe and 
recall. The examination by the courts seems, however, to be focused on the child's 
ability to distinguish between a truth and a lie. In Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 
1981 1 SA 1021 (A) the court accepted the relevance of the aforementioned 
principles, but attributed them to credibility rather than competence. Also see S v B 
2003 1 SACR 52 (SCA) para 14; S v Sikhipha 2006 2 SACR 439 (SCA) para 13; 
DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 165-167; S v Swartz 
2009 1 SACR 452 (C). 
21 S v L 1973 1 SA 344 (KPA) 348A-H. 
22 S v L 1973 1 SA 344 (KPA) 348E. Also see S v T 1973 3 SA 794 (A); Chaimowitz v 
Chaimowitz 1 1960 4 SA 818 (C); S v N 1996 2 SACR 225 (C) 229I; S v B 2003 1 
SACR 52 (SCA) para 14; S v Gallant 2008 1 SACR 196 (E); DPP v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development paras 165-167. The religious sanction of the oath 
has been watered down since the 19th century in view of the fact that not all children 
receive religious instruction at school (see Lyon 2000 S Cal L Rev 1020). 
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If the presiding officer is of the opinion that the child does not have a 
sufficient understanding of the nature and import of an oath, a finding to this 
effect should be made.23 It is recommended that this finding (even if it is not 
a formal one) as well as the reasons therefor should be recorded.24 The 
presiding officer then has to determine whether the child is competent to 
give unsworn testimony in terms of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. Section 164 states the following: 
Any person, who is found not to understand the nature and import of the oath 
or the affirmation, may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings 
without taking the oath or making the affirmation: Provided that such person 
shall, in lieu of the oath or affirmation, be admonished by the presiding officer 
to speak the truth. 
In terms of section 164 a child may nevertheless be a competent witness 
even if he or she does not understand the nature of the oath, provided the 
child has been admonished by the court to speak the truth.25 The fact that 
the child's evidence is unsworn does not necessarily mean that it will be 
accorded less weight or that it becomes less reliable.26 In Chaimowitz v 
Chaimowitz27 the court reaffirmed that a child must be either sworn or 
warned to speak the truth and stated with reference to Scoble: 
Obviously, a child whose intellect is so immature that he is incapable of giving 
a rational or coherent account of his observation, or is unable to distinguish 
the difference between fact and fancy, or cannot realise the necessity of telling 
the truth, must be regarded as an incompetent witness. 
Müller28 correctly points out that according to Scoble the test entails more 
than just being able to distinguish between truths and lies. The test requires 
that a child should be capable of making observations and giving a rational 
and coherent account of these observations. In addition, a child should 
know the difference between facts and fantasy. The test for a child's 
                                            
23 S v Malinga 2002 1 SACR 615 (N). In S v B 2003 1 SACR 52 (SCA) 563. The court 
held, however, that an inquiry (although desirable) is not always necessary to make 
a finding in terms of section 164, as a child's youthfulness may justify such a finding. 
In S v Gallant 2008 1 SACR 196 (E) Revelas J held, however, that a failure to make 
a finding that the witness was unable to understand the oath or admonition rendered 
the evidence inadmissible. Also see S v Williams 2010 1 SACR 493 (E) where the 
court relied on S v B 2003 1 SACR 52 (SCA). See further S v Matshiva 2014 1 SACR 
29 (SCA) para 11, where the court stated that a finding in terms of s 164 must be 
preceded by some form of enquiry. However, in S v Mali 2017 JDR 0893 (ECG) the 
court at para 12 held that the statement in S v Matshiva was a manifest oversight, 
as none of the earlier Supreme Court of Appeal decisions were referred to and the 
doctrine of judicial precedent required S v Matshiva to follow earlier judgments. 
24 S v Stefaans 1999 1 SACR 182 (C) 185E. 
25 S v BM 2012 2 SACR 507 (FB); S v Mali 2017 JDR 0893 (ECG) para 13. 
26 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 149. See also R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A); S v BM 
2012 2 SACR 507 (FB).  
27 Chaimowitz v Chaimowitz 1 1960 4 SA 818 (C) 819H, 820A. 
28 Müller Judicial Officer 149. 
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competency therefore involves four fundamental issues which should all be 
taken into account by the presiding officer in his or her determination of a 
child's competency, namely: 
 the child's mental capacity to observe an event; 
 the child's capacity to remember the event about which he or she has 
to testify; 
 the child's capacity to communicate about the event; 
 the child's possession of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the 
obligation to speak the truth.29 
Zeffert and Paizes30 point out, however, that the competency test entails 
that:  
… if he [a child] does not have the intelligence to distinguish between what is 
true or false, and to recognise the danger and wickedness of lying, he is 
incompetent and incompetence cannot be cured by admonishing him to tell 
the truth. 
According to this test, even though a child may have the capacity to observe, 
recall and communicate, the child cannot be admonished if he or she does 
not know the difference between a truth and an untruth. Schwikkard31 
argues that the abovementioned competency test amounts to a 
presumption of incompetence, as the evidence of children is permissible 
only once they have been found to be competent witnesses. She correctly 
contends that no such presumption applies to convicted perjurers or other 
persons convicted of crimes involving elements of dishonesty. She 
emphasises that this may lead to reliable testimony being excluded and may 
inhibit effective prosecution. While the evidence of adults falling into the 
aforementioned categories would be admissible, even if it is full of lies, 
inaccuracies and improbabilities, children's evidence would not be 
admissible. If adults' evidence is found to be unreliable, it would merely be 
rejected.32 Erasmus33 and McEwan34 make a suggestion which is supported 
by the writer hereof that this presumption of incompetence may, despite 
                                            
29 Refer to Müller Judicial Officer 149-151 for a detailed discussion of the issues. Also 
note that in S v Swartz 2009 1 SACR 452 (C) para 21 the court held that the 
competency requirements are not satisfied if a child can give an accurate and 
coherent account of the events but cannot distinguish between the truth and a lie. 
30 Zeffert and Paizes Essential Evidence 259. 
31 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 149. 
32 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 149. 
33 Erasmus 2010 Speculum Juris 109. 
34 McEwan 1988 CLR 815. 
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research findings to the contrary, be the result of the perception that young 
children are as a rule untruthful. Yet there is no evidence that children are 
more likely than adults to lie.35 Ovens et al point out, with reference to 
Quinn,36 that "children do lie, just as adults do lie", but that "often children 
make statements that are not factually accurate, but they are not 'lies' 
because the child lacks the intention to wilfully mislead or deceive."37 
Wigmore likewise draws attention to the fact that one must accept the 
"rooted ingenuity of children and their tendency to speak straightforwardly 
what is in their mind."38 
Schwikkard furthermore calls attention to the fact that truth and the duty to 
tell the truth are abstract notions which young children may not be able to 
understand or explain, but that this does not mean that children cannot give 
a reliable account of the events in question. She advocates that children 
should still be allowed to testify, stressing that in assessing credibility the 
court will give little weight to the fact that a witness took the oath or was 
admonished to tell the truth, but will instead look to factors such as 
coherence under cross-examination, evidence of surrounding 
circumstances and demeanour.39 Wigmore also believes that "the sensible 
way would be to put the child upon the stand and let it tell its story for what 
it may seem worth".40 
This aspect was specifically addressed in S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane.41 
In the said case Bertelsmann J reasoned along similar lines to Wigmore and 
Schwikkard and held the proviso to section 164(1) to be unacceptable and 
unconstitutional in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
199642 because it does not: 
… take into account that a witness who, for whatever reason, may not be able 
to understand or to verbalise an understanding of the abstract intellectual 
concepts of truth or falsehood, may nonetheless be perfectly able to convey 
the general experience that has led to the witness becoming involved in the 
criminal case.43 
This finding was not confirmed by the Constitutional Court, however. In DPP 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development44 the court 
acknowledged that questioning may at times be very confusing and even 
                                            
35 McEwan 1988 CLR 815. 
36 Quinn 1988 Behav Sci & L 185. 
37 Ovens, Lamprechts and Prinsloo 2001 Acta Criminologica 29. 
38 Wigmore Evidence in Trials 719. 
39 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 149. 
40 Wigmore Evidence in Trials 719. 
41 S v Mokeona; S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T). 
42  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution). 
43 S v Mokeona; S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T) para 139. 
44 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 165. 
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terrifying for a child. The court also conceded that some of the questions put 
to children by judicial officers "are very theoretical and seek to determine 
the child's understanding of the abstract concepts of truth and falsehood."45 
The result of such questions may leave the judicial officer with the 
impression that the child does not understand what it means to speak the 
truth and may lead to a child's being disqualified from giving evidence.46 
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the reason for receiving evidence 
under oath or affirmation is to ensure that the evidence given is reliable and 
does not undermine the accused's right to a fair trial. The court held that the 
evidence of a child who does not understand what it means to tell the truth 
is unreliable. Accordingly, when a child cannot convey his or her 
appreciation of the abstract concepts of truth and falsehood, the solution 
does not lie in allowing every child to testify in court.47 The solution, 
according to the court, lies in the proper questioning of children and in 
particular of younger children. The purpose of the questioning is to 
determine whether the child understands what it means to speak the truth 
and not to get the child to demonstrate knowledge of the abstract concepts 
of truth and falsehood.48 
The court conceded that this questioning requires special skill and that 
although some judicial officers may have this skill, they are the minority. In 
this regard the court underlined the significant role of intermediaries in that 
"everything seems to turn upon the need for intermediaries when young 
children testify in court".49 Properly trained intermediaries have particular 
skill in questioning and communicating with children. This skill, along with 
their integrity, is vital in ensuring both that innocent people are not wrongly 
convicted and that guilty people are held to account. The court therefore 
concluded that the conclusion by the High Court that the proviso to section 
164(1) is inconsistent with the Constitution cannot be upheld.50 
The current legal position is therefore that the presiding officer is still obliged 
to decide on the competency of a witness before testimony can be 
                                            
45 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 165. 
46 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 165. 
47 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 166-167. 
48 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 166-167. Also see 
S v BM 2012 2 SACR 507 (FB), where the State's case in a prosecution of rape 
rested on the evidence of a nine-year-old complainant and her eleven-year-old 
friend. With reference to DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
it was held by the Court of Appeal at para 8.3 that although the two witnesses might 
not have had an appreciation of the "abstract concepts of truth and falsehood", they 
were nevertheless able to and in fact did convey to the court a quo what had 
happened to them. 
49 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 168. 
50 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 169. 
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accepted.51 In terms of section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Act, this 
inquiry "may" or "shall" be administered by the presiding officer through an 
intermediary if the person concerned is to give evidence through an 
intermediary.52 It is regrettable that the court, despite highlighting the fact 
that intermediaries are key to the questioning of children in the 
determination of competency, did not provide any guidelines in DPP v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development as to the circumstances 
in which an intermediary should assist in this process.53 Are we to assume 
that this will be applicable only in a section 170A application?54  
Furthermore, although the notion of the use of intermediaries in the 
determination of competency is supported,55 it should be noted that this 
solution fails to address the situation where the questioning of a young 
witness through an intermediary may be vital, but such an intermediary is 
not available. It is general knowledge that intermediaries are not always 
available, and the court even referred to this problem in DPP v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development.56  
This may nevertheless result in a situation where the truthful and reliable 
evidence of a child may be excluded as a result of poor, inadequate and 
                                            
51  Mpontshane v S 2016 4 All SA 145 (KZP); S v FM 2016 3 NR 724 (NLD); S v Mbokazi 
2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP). 
52 Note that the heading of section 165 of the Act uses the word "may", whereas the 
section itself uses the word "shall." This leaves uncertainty as to whether the use of 
an intermediary in this context is compulsory or subject to the discretion of the 
presiding officer. 
53 The only indication was with reference to "young children." See DPP v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development para 168.  
54 See S v BM 2012 2 SACR 507 (FB), where the state's case in the prosecution of a 
rape case rested on the evidence of a nine-year-old complainant and her eleven-
year-old friend. At trial the complainant in the case testified with the aid of an 
intermediary and the magistrate satisfied himself of her competence by "virtue of 
questions put through the medium of the intermediary" (para 8.2), while the eleven-
year-old witness testified in open court in the presence of the accused and the inquiry 
into the competence of the child witness was conducted by the magistrate (para 8.1). 
The differentiation in the court's approach between the complainant and the child 
witness is not explained, since while the complainant testified to the rape, the child 
witness was called to testify about knowing the accused and about being requested 
by the accused to call the complainant to the house that the accused visited. One 
could possibly assume that the presiding officer and/or prosecutor was of the opinion 
that the child witness would not suffer undue mental stress or suffering as a result of 
having to testify in open court. Whether this was the case and whether the child 
witness was in fact assessed prior to the hearing remains unclear from the record of 
the reported case. The abovementioned question can therefore not be answered 
with any certainty. 
55 In this regard an intermediary may assist the presiding officer with information 
pertaining to the child's cognitive and emotional developmental level.  
56 DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 246. 
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developmentally inappropriate questioning by a presiding officer.57 This 
dilemma is further exacerbated by the fact that no standard test for 
questioning is used in South African courts to determine whether a child 
understands the difference between truth and lies. This may lead to 
inconsistencies and increases the danger of haphazard questions with no 
certain reliability and validity being used. Presiding officers may not even 
realise that their questioning is inadequate. Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel58 
allude to this problem in their discussion of S v QN.59 
In the said case the court a quo, after being satisfied that the witness, owing 
to her age, did not understand the nature and import of the oath, established 
her competence by interacting with her in order to determine her 
understanding of the difference between truth and falsehood. The appeal 
court approved the way in which the regional magistrate had questioned 
and established the competence of the witness. The interaction between 
the regional magistrate and the child witness is encapsulated in the 
following exchange:60 
'Do your parents ever give you a hiding?' to which N [the witness] replied: 'Yes. 
My mother assaults me if ever I am naughty at home.' The magistrate 
continued: '… What do you mean naughty?' to which N replied, 'My mother 
gives me a hiding when I am telling lies.' This was followed by a question of 
the magistrate, 'So is it a good or a bad thing to tell lies?' To which the reply 
was given, 'It's a bad thing, Your Worship'. 
Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel61 point out, and correctly so, that this exchange 
did not in fact establish that the complainant/witness understood the 
difference between truth and lies. There was, they contended, "no 
exploration of what it is to tell a lie which involves deliberate deceiving of 
another by providing inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise misleading 
information."62 They highlight that this need not be done in an overly 
technical manner, but indicate that international literature63 suggests the 
use of simple identification questions.64 They moreover emphasise that 
research shows little correlation between a child's performance on the truth-
lie test and actual truth-telling behaviour. Conversely, even children who are 
unable to articulate the distinction between truth and lies are able to identify 
true and false statements and indicate a preference for the truth. They 
                                            
57 See for example S v Raghubar 2013 1 SACR 389 (SCA) para 7; see also S v 
Tshimbudzi 2013 1 SACR 528 (SCA), where no enquiry at all was held by the trial 
court. 
58  Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel 2013 Obiter 359, 364. 
59  S v QN 2012 1 SACR 380 (KZP). 
60  S v QN 2012 1 SACR 380 (KZP) para 11. 
61  Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel 2013 Obiter 364. 
62  Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel 2013 Obiter 364. 
63  Klemfuss and Ceci 2012 Dev Rev 266, 275-277. 
64  Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel 2013 Obiter 359, 364. 
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accordingly question the validity of the Constitutional Court's rejection of the 
abolition of the competency test in DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development.65 
The response of a 13-year-old complainant in S v Mbokazi,66 which was 
held on appeal to be sufficient, would probably likewise dismay Banoobhai 
and Whitear-Nel, if not more so than S v QN. When asked by the magistrate 
what it means to tell the truth the complainant said that: "Telling the truth is 
saying something that is straight and something that is understandable." 
When asked what it means to tell lies she answered that: "It's speaking 
something that is not understandable. Someone … would not even know 
what you are saying." The court67 with reference to the Oxford English 
Dictionary interpreted "straight" as "not evasive; honest: a straight answer" 
and regarded "something that is not understandable" to mean that "if you lie 
it is something that you manufactured, a figment of your imagination and 
something that people will not understand, as it is not in existence or an 
untruth." It is doubtful whether a child's competency can be determined from 
this line of questioning and it is submitted that the magistrate, as indicated 
in the judgment, more correctly determined her competence from the 
manner in which she gave evidence and answered cross-examination 
questions.68 
Although the magistrate's determination of the competency of the 
complainant may be questionable, her handling of the evidence is 
commendable. She considered the complainant's ability to understand the 
questions put to her and the court's understanding thereof. She was mindful 
of the fact that the complainant's evidence was that of a young child and 
she guarded "against two elements – suggestibility and imaginativeness." 
She was also alive to the fact that "she was dealing with the evidence of a 
single witness."69 The magistrate furthermore "weighed up all the evidence 
in its totality, and accepted that the state had proved its case beyond any 
reasonable doubt."70 This is precisely the type of action that the South 
African Law Commission has proposed as acceptable in determining the 
competency of child witnesses in its discussion paper on sexual offences.71 
                                            
65  Banoobhai and Whitear-Nel 2013 Obiter 364, 365. 
66  S v Mbokazi 2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP). 
67  S v Mbokazi 2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP) paras 11-12. 
68  S v Mbokazi 2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP) para 16. 
69  S v Mbokazi 2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP) para 22. 
70  S v Mbokazi 2017 1 SACR 317 (KZP) para 22. 
71  SALC Project 107 99. 
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3 South African reform proposals 
The competency of child witnesses was explored again by the Commission 
in its discussion paper on sexual offences.72 The Commission expressed 
the opinion that the exclusion of the evidence of a witness as a result of that 
witness’ not meeting the requirements of sections 162, 163 or 164 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act seems to run counter to the goal of bringing all 
relevant evidence before the court. It also ignored the ability of the presiding 
officer to decide on the weight and credibility to be accorded such 
evidence.73 The Commission submitted that all witnesses should be 
regarded as competent to testify if they are able to understand the questions 
put to them and the court can understand their answers. If the evidence 
appears to be unsatisfactory, the presiding officer can exercise his or her 
statutory power to exclude the evidence as irrelevant. Despite their 
recommendations, the Commission nevertheless acknowledged the 
seriousness and solemnity of the proceedings and retained the requirement 
that a witness be enjoined to tell the truth. The Commission thus 
recommended that:74 
… section 164(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act be amended that all witnesses 
should be regarded as competent to testify if they can understand the 
questions put to them and can in return give answers that the court can 
understand. Further that a new section be inserted in the Sexual Offences Act 
clearly establishing that any child in a sexual offence trial is competent to 
testify. 
The Commission's proposal therefore entails a completely new test for 
competency, namely the ability to understand and answer questions. The 
test focuses largely on the cognitive abilities of a child and relates to 
language development and communication skills.75 What is required of the 
court is to determine whether the child is able to communicate and give a 
coherent and comprehensible account of matters in relation to his or her 
testimony. Again, the role of skilled questioners is vital to the successful 
implementation of such a test. 
The proposals of the Commission have not yet been implemented. In S v 
Swartz76 the court pointed out that an examination of most Anglo-American 
jurisdictions shows that what these competency tests should account for is 
the likelihood that the child has an accurate memory of the events, is able 
to recall those memories and can communicate the recalled information 
accurately. The court pointed out that our criminal system still requires 
                                            
72 SALC Project 107 99. 
73 SALC Project 107 99. 
74 SALC Project 107 100-101. 
75 Müller Judicial Officer 160. 
76 S v Swartz 2009 1 SACR 452 (C) para 16. 
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competency (the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood) when 
dealing with child witnesses as opposed to intelligibility, as required by some 
other Anglo-American jurisdictions.77 In S v Swartz78 Steyn AJ held that this 
competency requirement cannot be abandoned simply because it appears 
to operate unfairly. 
Given that some of the Anglo-American jurisdictions have recently amended 
their position on the competency testing of child witnesses, it is of value to 
consider a few of these jurisdictions. 
4 Statutory reform in other jurisdictions 
4.1 Canada 
In 2004, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of Canada's House 
of Commons considered new legislation dealing with a range of issues 
related to child victimisation and child witnesses in the criminal justice 
system. A brief prepared by the Child Witness Project Group on competency 
enquiry issues was considered.79 The Committee also heard testimony from 
one of the members of the Project (Bala) about the psychological research 
that had been carried out in Canada and elsewhere on the subject of child 
competency.80 
As a result of the presentation and research findings, amendments were 
made to Canadian legislation to align it with the research findings. In terms 
of the amendment to the Canada Evidence Act,81 which came into force in 
January 2006, a new approach for children under the age of fourteen was 
established. Section 16.1 thereof provides as follows: 
                                            
77 See for example s 52 of England's Criminal Justice Act, 1991. 
78 S v Swartz 2009 1 SACR 452 (C) para 21. 
79  Bala et al 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 53-77. The Child Witness Project is an 
interdisciplinary research team, established in 1999 and based primarily at Queens 
University in Canada. The research team conducted a number of laboratory 
experiments, involving hundreds of children, to ascertain whether the legal tests 
used in Canada for assessing the competency of child witnesses had any validity for 
identifying children who are more likely to tell the truth. 
80  Bala et al 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 53-77. The findings of such research suggest 
that truth-telling behaviour in children is not related to knowing the correct answers 
to questions about truth and lies, nor is it related to knowing that lying is bad. The 
findings call into question the belief that a traditional competency inquiry could help 
a court ascertain whether or not a child is likely to lie when testifying. The research 
suggests that while the act of promising to tell the truth does not eliminate the 
possibility that a child will lie, it significantly reduces the frequency of lying. A number 
of studies have found that having a child promise to tell the truth makes it more likely 
that a child will tell the truth. Also see Lyon et al 2008 Child Development 914–929. 
81  Section 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act RSC 1985, Chap 5 (enacted as SC 2005, 
c 32, s 27). 
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(1) A person under fourteen years of age is presumed to have the capacity 
to testify. 
No oath or solemn affirmation 
(2) A proposed witness under fourteen years of age shall not take an oath 
or make a solemn affirmation despite a provision of any Act that 
requires an oath or a solemn affirmation. 
Evidence shall be received 
(3) The evidence of a proposed witness under fourteen years of age shall 
be received if they are able to understand and respond to questions. 
Burden as to capacity of witness 
(4) A party who challenges the capacity of a proposed witness under 
fourteen years of age has the burden of satisfying the court that there 
is an issue as to the capacity of the proposed witness to understand 
and respond to questions. 
Court inquiry 
(5) If the court is satisfied that there is an issue as to the capacity of a 
proposed witness under fourteen years of age to understand and 
respond to questions, it shall, before permitting them to give evidence, 
conduct an inquiry to determine whether they are able to understand 
and respond to questions. 
Promise to tell truth 
(6) The court shall, before permitting a proposed witness under fourteen 
years of age to give evidence, require them to promise to tell the truth. 
Understanding of promise 
(7) No proposed witness under fourteen years of age shall be asked any 
questions regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise to 
tell the truth for the purpose of determining whether their evidence shall 
be received by the court. 
Effect 
(8) For greater certainty, if the evidence of a witness under fourteen years 
of age is received by the court, it shall have the same effect as if it were 
taken under oath. 
In terms of section 16.1(1) of the Canada Evidence Act all children are 
presumed to be competent to testify. While children are required in terms of 
subsection (6) to "promise to tell the truth" before being allowed to testify, 
subsection (7) specifies that no child shall be "asked any questions 
regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise to tell the truth 
for the purpose of determining whether the evidence shall be received by 
the court." Children under fourteen are also not obliged to take an oath or 
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affirmation in terms of the new provisions, but need only to be able to 
understand and respond to questions.82 
 A party who challenges the capacity (competency) of a child under fourteen 
years of age to communicate in court bears the burden of satisfying the 
court that this is an issue. In this case, if there is an inquiry, it is restricted to 
whether the child is able "to understand and respond to questions." The 
issue of competence thus arises only if there is a real issue about the child's 
ability to meaningfully answer questions. The central focus under the new 
tests is whether the child has the basic cognitive and language abilities 
necessary to enable him or her to answer the questions put to him or her. 
This is determined by the judge. The questioning by the judge, however, 
needs to be only relatively brief in determining whether the child has the 
capacity to remember past events and answer questions about those 
events. The questions posed must be developmental and age appropriate.83 
These provisions ensure that children are no longer required to answer 
questions about the nature of an oath or questions about abstract concepts 
such as truth and lies. Section 16.1(8) provides that if a child testifies after 
promising to tell the truth, this shall have the same effect as if he or she 
testified under oath. 
These new provisions have simplified and shortened the process for 
qualifying children to give evidence in criminal cases in Canada. It has also 
been positively received by Canadian judges and declared constitutionally 
valid.84 In one of the most significant constitutional decisions, R v JS,85 the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that section 16.1 of the Canada 
Evidence Act is not only constitutionally valid but also reflects the procedural 
and evolutionary evolution of Canada's criminal justice system.86 The Court 
of Appeal noted that section 16.1 "places the child witness on a more equal 
footing to adult witness by presuming testimonial competence" and reflects 
the findings of the Child Witness Project that it is the accuracy of a child's 
evidence that is of paramount importance, not the ability of a child to 
articulate abstract concepts.87 
                                            
82  Section 16.1(2), (3) of the Canada Evidence Act RSC 1985, Chap 5 (enacted as SC 
2005, c 32, s 27). 
83  Bala 2014 Roger Williams U L Rev 513, 527. 
84  Bala 2014 Roger Williams U L Rev 513, 528. 
85  R v JS 2008 BCCA 401 (Can). 
86  R v JS 2008 BCCA 401 (Can) para 52. 
87  R v JS 2008 BCCA 401 (Can) paras 52-53. 
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4.2 United Kingdom 
With the enactment of section 53 of the Youth Justice and Evidence Act 
1999,88 England and Wales also reformed their laws governing child witness 
competency enquiries in criminal proceedings. In terms of section 53, "[at] 
every stage in criminal proceedings all persons are (whatever their age) 
competent to give evidence" provided such a person is "able to understand 
questions put to him as witness, and give answers to them which can be 
understood". Children of any age can hence be called to testify, as their 
competence depends upon their understanding and not their age. Although 
each assessment of competency is witness specific, the same test 
regarding competency is applied to child witnesses as for adult witnesses.89 
No presumptions or preconceptions prevail. A child, like any other individual 
witness, is competent subject to the exception that he or she is able to 
understand questions and give answers which can be understood.90 The 
witness, however, need not understand every single question nor give a 
readily understood answer to every question.91 
A question as to the competence of a witness may be raised by a party to 
the proceedings or the court of its own motion. In the event that an issue 
arises as to the competence of a child witness, the court will determine the 
competence of the witness.92 In R v Barker93 the Court of Appeal gave some 
guidance in relation to section 53. The Court averred that although the 
distinction is a fine one, what is required of the court is not the exercise of 
discretion but the making of a judgment, namely whether the witness fulfils 
the statutory criteria. The court pointed out that it is not up to the judge to 
create or impose additional but non-statutory criteria based on the approach 
of earlier generations to the evidence of small children. Although the 
chronological age of the child may help to inform the judicial decision about 
competency, in the end it is a decision about the individual child and his or 
her competence to give evidence in the particular trial. The purpose of the 
trial process is to identify that evidence which is reliable and that which is 
not. If competent, as defined by the statutory criteria, the child witness starts 
off on an equal footing with every other witness.94 
                                            
88  Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, c 23. 
89  R v Barker 2010 EWCA Crim 4 para 38; Crown Prosecution Service 2017 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/competence_and_compellability. 
90  Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 c 23, s 53; R v Barker 2010 EWCA 
Crim 4 para 38. 
91  R v Barker 2010 EWCA Crim 4 para 38. 
92  Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 c 23, s 54. 
93  R v Barker 2010 EWCA Crim 4 para 39. 
94  R v Barker 2010 EWCA Crim 4 para 40. 
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The party calling the witness bears the burden of satisfying the court on a 
balance of probabilities that the witness is competent. Expert evidence may 
be received on the question.95 It should also be noted that the assessment 
of competency should, where applicable, take into account techniques or 
measures that can be used to assist the child witness in giving his or her 
evidence, such as the use of a registered intermediary. The competency 
test is not failed because of the techniques or methods.96 The role of the 
intermediary in this instance is to assist the witness in giving evidence to the 
best of his or her ability, and not to comment on the credibility or 
competence of the witness.97 
4.3  New Zealand 
In 1996 the New Zealand Law Commission released proposals for 
amendments to the evidence law of New Zealand.98 This included a 
recommendation that the competency test for children be abolished and that 
everyone, including children, be deemed eligible to testify.99 In its 
recommendation on the abolition of the competency test the Commission 
noted that "the operation of the present competence rules does not 
accurately predict whether a witness will give honest or accurate testimony" 
and that the "most useful way of assessing credibility seems to be that 
undertaken by the fact finder in making a verdict choice."100 The 
Commission hence concluded that on balance it prefers the option of 
abolishing the competency requirements so that:101 
 more relevant information is available to the court; 
 any concerns about reliability and credibility may be evaluated by the trier of 
fact; and 
 any difficulties relating to communication abilities, psychological 
vulnerabilities and potential sources of unreliability may be addressed by 
assisting witnesses to give evidence more effectively and ensuring 
appropriate support. 
                                            
95  Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 c 23, s 54(5). 
96  R v Barker 2010 EWCA Crim 4 para 42. 
97  Crown Prosecution Service 2017 https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/competence_ 
and_compellability; Monaghan Law of Evidence 312. 
98  New Zealand Law Commission 1996 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-
projects/evidence-law-evidence-children-and-other-vulnerable-witnesses. 
99  New Zealand Law Commission 1996 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/ 
publication/1990/08/Publication_56_163_R55_Vol_1.pdf. 
100  New Zealand Law Commission 1996 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-
projects/evidence-law-evidence-children-and-other-vulnerable-witnesses para 72. 
101  New Zealand Law Commission 1996 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/our-projects/ 
  evidence-law-evidence-children-and-other-vulnerable-witnesses para 75. 
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In 2006 New Zealand's law of evidence was codified through the Evidence 
Act, which replaced the existing legislation and incorporated many of the 
Law Commission's 1999 recommendations. In terms of section 71 of the 
Evidence Act of 2006, "any person is eligible to give evidence" in civil or 
criminal proceedings. The provision accordingly eliminates any objections 
to the eligibility of a witness based on age. Moreover, while witnesses must 
still take an oath or make a promise to tell the truth in terms of section 77 of 
the Evidence Act of 2006, section 71 abolishes the common law test of 
competence for children under 12 years of age.102 In R v Jellyman103 the 
Court of Appeal confirmed that section 71 replaced the concept of 
competency, along with the associated common law test of competency, 
with that of eligibility. 
In terms of section 77 of the Evidence Act of 2006, "[a] witness in a 
proceeding who is under the age of 12 years (a) must be informed by the 
Judge of the importance of telling the truth and not telling lies; and (b) must, 
after being given that information make a promise to tell the truth before 
giving evidence". According to Mahoney et al,104 the requirement that the 
judge inform a witness under 12 years of age of the importance of telling the 
truth was instituted in order to ensure that the witness is aware of the 
solemnity of the occasion; while the reference to not telling lies recognises 
that it may be easier for a child witness to understand the concept of not 
telling lies than that of telling the truth.  
Mahoney et al,105 however, observe that the requirement to make a promise 
to tell the truth arguably leaves open the possibility of inquiries into the 
understanding of the child witness regarding the making of promises and 
telling lies. In this regard they give the example of Blagojevich v R,106 where 
the child complainant gave video recorded evidence and the interviewer 
discussed with her the concept of lies and promises, resulting in the child's 
promise to tell the truth. In its evaluation of the evidence the Court of Appeal 
commented on the child's level of understanding, stating that: "[w]hile 
initially the interview discloses the complainant struggled with the concept 
of a promise it discloses that she understood the concept of telling the 
truth."107 
In its five-yearly review of the Evidence Act of 2006 the New Zealand Law 
Commission reported that it remained of the view that a rule of universal 
eligibility is desirable. In the event that a person has evidence that is relevant 
                                            
102  Mahoney et al Evidence Act 2006 349-350. 
103  R v Jellyman 2009 NZCA 532 para 30. 
104  Mahoney et al Evidence Act 2006 366. 
105  Mahoney et al Evidence Act 2006 366. 
106  Blagojevich v R 2011 NZCA 217. 
107  Blagojevich v R 2011 NZCA 217 para 19. 
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and probative, the person should be allowed to give evidence as a witness 
and that evidence should be available to the fact-finder. Any questions as 
to the quality of the evidence can be answered by the fact-finder and the 
evidence may be excluded in terms of section 8 of the Evidence Act of 2006, 
which is the general exclusion provision. This, the Law Commission stated, 
ensures that decisions about admissibility are properly focused on the 
quality of the evidence rather than the quality of the witness. Also, other 
provisions in the Evidence Act of 2006 (such as alternative ways of giving 
evidence and communication assistance) are available to enhance the 
quality of the witness' evidence.108 
5 Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 1989: child participation 
Although the scope of the paper does not allow an in-depth discussion on 
international law, it is apposite to consider article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC).109  
Article 12 of the CRC reads as follows: 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting 
the child, the view of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child 
either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a 
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
Article 12 of the CRC addresses the legal status of children who on 
the one hand lack the full autonomy of adults, but on the other are the 
subjects of individual rights. Article 12 accomplishes this by assuring 
every child capable of forming his or her views the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, which views should 
be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child. Paragraph 2 in particular affords the child this right in any judicial 
or administrative proceedings affecting the child. 
The right of a child to be heard constitutes one of the fundamental core 
values of the CRC. Not only is the right established in article 12 as a 
                                            
108  New Zealand Law Commission 2013 http://r127.publications.lawcom.govt.nz. 
109  South Africa ratified the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child (1989) 
on 16 June 1995. 
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right in itself but it should also be considered in the interpretation and 
implementation of other rights, thereby enhancing its importance.110 
5.1 General Comment 12: the right of the child to be heard 
Despite States Parties' commitment to the realisation of article 12, the 
implementation of the child's right to express his or her views freely 
continues to be impeded by many long-standing practices and 
attitudes as well as by political and economic barriers. This is 
particularly true for certain groups of children, such as younger boys 
and girls, as well as children belonging to marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups. In recognition of this fact, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child deemed it important and necessary to issue a 
general comment on article 12.111 The Committee therefore issued 
General Comment No 12 (2009) The right of the child to be heard 
(hereafter "GC 12"), which was adopted on 20 July 2009.112  
According to the Committee the overall objective of the general 
comments is to support States Parties in their effective implementation 
of the right. In so doing the Committee seeks to: 
(a) improve understanding of the meaning of article 12 and its implications for 
States Parties and other stakeholders; 
(b) elaborate on the scope of legislation, policy and practice necessary to 
achieve the full implementation of article 12; 
(c) emphasise positive approaches in implementing article 12; and 
(d) propose basic requirements for appropriate ways to give due weight to 
children's views in matters affecting them.113 
In order to achieve the first objective, namely to have a clear understanding 
of the meaning of article 12, the Committee provides an in-depth analysis of 
article 12.114 Major elements of this analysis are described below.  
(a) Paragraph 1 of article 12 
(i)  "shall assure" 
Article 12, paragraph 1 provides that States Parties "shall assure" the right 
of children to freely express their respective views in all matters affecting 
them. States Parties are reminded by the Committee that this places a 
                                            
110  Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 12 - The Right of the Child 
to be Heard (2009) (hereafter GC 12) paras 1-3. 
111  GC 12 para 4. 
112  Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 12 - The Right of the Child 
to be Heard (2009). 
113  GC 12 para 8. 
114  GC 12 paras 19-38. 
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positive obligation on them to ensure that mechanisms are in place for 
children to express their views and for due weight to be given to such 
views.115 
(ii)  "capable of forming his or her views" 
The Committee states that this phrase should not be seen as a limitation, 
but rather as an obligation on States Parties to assess the capacity of the 
child as far as possible. In this regard States Parties should presume that a 
child is capable of expressing his or her views and has the right to express 
them. In terms of the principles of the article, it is therefore not up to the 
child to prove his or her capacity. 
The Committee furthermore emphasises that article 12 imposes no age limit 
on the right of the child to express his or her views. States Parties are 
discouraged from introducing any age limits either in law or in practice that 
would disqualify children from exercising this right. In this regard the 
Committee underlines the fact that even very young children are capable of 
expressing their views and that it not necessary for a child to have a 
comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of the matter affecting him or her, 
but rather a sufficient understanding to be able to appropriately form his or 
her views on the matter.116  
(iii)  "the right to express those views freely" 
The Committee points out that "freely" implies that a child can choose 
whether or not he or she wants to exercise his or her right to be heard. A 
child should therefore not be manipulated or subjected to undue influence 
or pressure. States Parties should therefore provide the child with an 
environment in which the child feels respected and secure when freely 
expressing his or her views.117 
(iv)  "in all matters affecting the child" 
If a matter under discussion affects a child, the child has a right to be heard 
and must be heard. This basic condition has to be respected and 
understood by States Parties in a broad sense.118  
                                            
115  GC 12 para 19. 
116  GC 12 paras 20-21. 
117  GC 12 paras 22-25. 
118  GC 12 paras 26-27. It should be noted that the Open-ended Working Group 
established by the Commission on Human Rights, which drafted the text of the 
Convention, rejected a proposal to define these "matters" by a list limiting the 
considerations of a child's or children's views. Instead, it was decided that the right 
of the child to be heard should refer to "all matters affecting the child." 
M BEKINK PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  23 
(v) "being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child" 
The Committee stresses that the term "being given due weight" implies 
that simply listening to the child is not sufficient; the views of the child 
have to be taken seriously. In addition they point out that by referring 
to the age and maturity of the child it is clear that age alone cannot 
determine the significance of the child's views. The views of each child 
should therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking the 
maturity of the child into account.119  
(b) Paragraph 2 of article 12 
(i)  The right "to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceeding 
affecting the child" 
The Committee emphasises that the provision applies to all relevant 
judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, without 
limitation, including, for example, the separation of parents, care and 
adoption issues as well as whether the child has fallen victim to 
physical or psychological violence, sexual abuse and other crimes.120 
(ii) "either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body" 
According to article 12 the child has a right to decide how to be heard, 
namely either directly or through a representative or appropriate body. 
The Committee recommends, however, that, where possible, the child 
should be given the opportunity to express his or her views directly. If 
the child's hearing is undertaken through a representative, it is of the 
utmost importance that the child's views should be transmitted 
correctly to the decision maker by the representative. Such a 
representative must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the various aspects of the decision-making process and should be 
experienced in working with children.121 
(iii)  "in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law" 
The Committee points out that this clause is not to be interpreted as 
permitting States Parties the use of procedural legislation which 
restricts or prevents the enjoyment of this fundamental right. On the 
contrary, States Parties are urged to comply with the basic rules of fair 
procedure, such as the right to a defence.122 
                                            
119  GC 12 paras 28-31.  
120  GC 12 paras 32-34. 
121  GC 12 paras 35-37. 
122  GC 12 para 38. 
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With regard to the Committee's second objective stated above, namely to 
elaborate on the scope of the legislation, policy and practice necessary to 
achieve the full implementation of article 12, the Committee provided a five-
step plan that needs to be followed by States Parties. This entails 
preparation, the hearing itself including the assessment of the capacity of 
the child (ie evidentiary issues), information about the weight given to the 
views of the child (feedback) as well as complaints, remedies and redress. 
In terms of these steps children should be informed of their right to express 
their views, which views should be taken seriously at the hearing itself.123 
The Committee also deemed it necessary to remind States Parties of their 
core obligations in terms of article 12, namely to amend legislation in order 
to introduce mechanisms providing children with access to appropriate 
information, adequate support, if necessary, feedback on the weight given 
to their views, and procedures for complaints, remedies or redress.124 
In addition the Committee set out specific obligations with regard to judicial 
(civil and penal) and administrative proceedings that need to be adhered to. 
Regarding child victims/witnesses in the penal judicial proceedings, the 
Committee stated that the child victim of a crime must be given an 
opportunity to fully exercise his or her right to freely express his or her views. 
This should be done in accordance with the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council resolution 2005/20 ("Guidelines on Justice in Matters 
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime").125 
In keeping with the provisions of article 12 of the CRC, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (the Council) emphasises that every effort 
should be made to enable child victims and witnesses to express their views 
or concerns relating to their involvement in the judicial process. In so doing 
professionals should ensure that child victims and witnesses are 
appropriately consulted and are able to express their views freely and in 
their own manner.126 
Article 12 of the CRC as well as the aforementioned Guidelines thereon 
stresses the importance of ensuring child participation in judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting them. It also lends support to the notion 
that all witnesses should be regarded as competent and that the focus 
should not be on whether the child has a "comprehensive knowledge of all 
aspects of the matter affecting the child" but rather whether the child has 
"sufficient understanding" to be able to understand the questions put to the 
child and in return to give answers that the court can understand. Article 12 
and the Guidelines furthermore stress the importance of drafting relevant 
national legislation, policies or protocols involving child victims and 
                                            
123  GC 12 paras 40-47. 
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125  ECOSOC 2005 http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2005/resolution%202005-20.pdf. 
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witnesses in conformity with the principles contained in the Guidelines and 
the CRC. They serve as a valuable tool to aid governments such as the 
South African government in so doing, and should accordingly be 
consulted.127 
6  Conclusion 
The above evaluation of the competency rules utilised by Canada, the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand illustrates that to a large extent (with the 
exception of having to promise to tell the truth) these correlate with the 
earlier recommendations made by the South African Law Commission, 
namely that section 164(1) of the South African Criminal Procedure Act be 
amended such that "all witnesses should be regarded as competent to 
testify if they can understand the questions put to them and can in return 
give answers that the court can understand."128 Such an amendment would 
also conform to the principles set out in article 12 of the CRC and the 
aforementioned Guidelines. Regrettably, the recommendations of the Law 
Commission have not resulted in an amendment to the existing legislation 
in South Africa. This can perhaps be attributed to a reluctance to move away 
from an accusatorial judicial system to a more inquisitorial system as well 
as the fear that the child's testimony may not be reliable.129 
It is widely submitted,130 which submission is supported by the writer hereof, 
that the competency test used in terms of the existing Criminal Procedure 
Act does in fact operate unfairly and that the use thereof warrants serious 
reconsideration. Current psychological research clearly shows that the 
ability of a child witness to understand and answer questions represents a 
more realistic and meaningful criterion to use to determine whether a child 
is competent to testify than the artificial, abstract inquiry into the child's 
understanding of concepts such as truth and lies.131 The proposal put 
forward by the South African Law Commission is one such test, and its 
introduction is long overdue. 
The test accords with the proposal made by Wigmore and Schwikkard that 
a child be allowed to testify and that the child's evidence then be assessed 
for what it may seem to be worth. If the evidence is found to be unreliable, 
                                            
127  Note that art 4 of the CRC states that "States Parties shall undertake all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention." In terms of art 4, governments have a 
responsibility to take all available steps to make sure children's rights are respected, 
protected and fulfilled. When countries ratify the Convention, they agree to review 
their laws relating to children. 
128  See para 3 above. 
129  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 166. 
130 SALC Project 107 102 fn 11. 
131  Bala et al 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 53, 75. 
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the court may reject it.132 This proposal assumes that children may be 
inadequate witnesses just as adults may be inadequate witnesses, but that 
the court should be allowed to come to an "intelligent conclusion" on the 
evidence of children as it would on the evidence of adults.133  
If the courts insist on a competency test of some kind, it is imperative that 
such an inquiry should be child sensitive, developmental and age 
appropriate.134 If this is the case, the child will be a competent witness and 
as accurate as an adult, if not more so.135 Cashmore136 sums up this 
phenomenon clearly by stating that the competence of children to interact 
with the legal system is a function of the competence of those dealing with 
them in that legal system. 
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